# T - TACTICS

### 1NC

#### A.     Interpretation: The affirmative must advocate a concrete exportable action to increase nato security cooperation

#### Should indicates a normative action

Cambridge Dictionary no date [<http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/should>]

**should: used to express that it is necessary, desirable, or important to perform the action of the following verb:**

#### Critical resistance to NATO and international relations requires a tactic, the aff at best is a strategy with no tactic to actualize change

Knox 12 (Dr. Robert Knox is a senior lecturer at the University of Liverpool - School of Law & Social Justice and received his PHD at London School of Economics & Political Science, “Strategy and Tactics”, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1921759>, 12/23/12)

In a 1990 interview in !e Postcolonial Critic, Gayatri Spivak described how she related her theoretical positions to her more ‘political’ interventions. She argued that although – theoretically and intellectually – she was opposed to ‘universalism’ or ‘essentialism’, it was necessary to make a ‘strategic choice’2 when intervening politically. !is strategic choice involved recognising that since the language of universalism or essentialism was the language in which political debates were conducted, one had to adopt this language in order to make an intervention. !us, she ‘spoke of universality because universality was in the air from the other side in the talk of female discourse ... and since I believe that one shouldn’t throw away things but use them, strategically ... perhaps here was an item which could be used as a universal signi#er’.3 !is position – that anti-essentialists should not simply discard essentialism, but must instead deploy essentialist arguments in concrete political contexts – has come to be known as ‘strategic essentialism’.4 Yet although such a position has an evident attraction, one can immediately imagine several problems with it. !e #rst problem is when one should use essentialism and when one should not. Spivak’s argument simply seems to be that there are some times that essentialism should be used and other times when it should not, what is lacking is any broader criterion as to its use or non-use. !e second problem is that of legitimation. Is it really the case that we should always engage in debates purely on the terms that we #nd them? In so doing, do we not risk winning the particular argument, whilst at the same time legitimating those broader structures that we wish to undermine? !e combination of these two arguments points to the third objection we can raise. If one uses essentialism whenever it is e$ective to do so, having no concern as to whether one’s behaviour is legitimating that very language, in what sense is one’s behaviour di$erent from anyone else’s? In other words, does strategic essentialism, in this sense, not simply collapse into essentialism? !ese problems stem from the fact that, notwithstanding its characterisation, Spivak’s position is not one of strategic essentialism at all. Although her position clearly is one that pays attention to the pragmatic dimensions of political interventions, these dimensions are con#ned purely to the short term. Whilst she gives an account of how immediate arguments might be won, she gives no consideration of how to recon"gure the terms of these arguments, thus undermining essentialism itself. At best, her position is one of tactical essentialism, paying little or no attention to the deeper or longer term aspects of the critique of essentialism. !is is not simply a matter of semantics. In con"ating strategy and tactics – a distinction that will be explored more fully below – Spivak completely subsumes the former into the latter, with the essential outcome that all matters of ‘e$ectiveness’ are reduced to purely short term considerations. What relevance does this have for international law? Whilst international law has always been a central feature of international politics, it is only in recent years that it has become a regular feature in the news media, and a more important part of ‘everyday’ political life. This has been particularly evident in the centrality that international law has come to assume in the construction and contestation of foreign policy.5 !ere have been various moments that were especially important in this process: beginning perhaps with Kosovo and culminating in the War on Terror and the 2003 Iraq war. Most recently, debates around the killing of Bin Laden and the NATO intervention in Libya have been conducted in fiercely juridical terms.6 For those scholars and practitioners of international law who identify themselves as part of the left this has raised considerable problems. The main question has been how to intervene in these debates in a distinctively left or critical fashion. This is linked to the more general question of how – or even whether – the left can utilise international law in such a way as to advance the interests of the oppressed and exploited.7 It is here that the above considerations on Spivak become relevant. As will be argued below, Spivak’s strategic essentialism is a sophisticated articulation of the basic logic that underpins a great deal of critical thinking on how to intervene in these debates. These accounts rely on the idea that a ‘strategic’ intervention has to be made into the existing debates, whilst focusing almost exclusively on short term, tactical considerations. Thus, strategy has become systematically confused with tactics, resulting in its exclusion from theoretical discourse. Those same problems identified in Spivak’s approach continually resurface in critical legal scholarship. This article seeks to challenge the above position and construct an alternative account of how critical international lawyers might intervene politically. To this end, Section 2 of this article brie"y reconstructs the distinction between strategy and tactics. In Section 2.1 this is achieved through examining the original context in which this distinction was articulated, that of military theory. Section 2.2 turns to a slightly di$erent sphere – that of political theory – and attempts to see how the originally military distinction has been understood in political terms. Section 3 examines how the distinction can illuminate the attempts of critical legal scholars to intervene in political debates. In section 3.1 an attempt is made to imagine what a strategic objective for critical legal theory might look like, through examining the theoretical commonalities of some of its participants. !is is followed by section 3.2 which uses the letter written by several academics against the Iraq war as a lens to examine how critical scholars have understood the relationship between strategy and tactics. Here it will be argued that these writings have fallen into the trap outlined above – confusing strategy with tactics – and ultimately end up collapsing into liberalism. Section 3.3 argues that one of the central elements of this position is that it erects a rigid dichotomy between ‘liberal legalism’ and ‘legal nihilism’, in which liberal legalism cannot help but seem attractive. Section 4 examines a number of writers in the Marxist tradition, arguing that their understanding of strategy allowed them to bridge the divide between liberal legalism and legal nihilism. Finally, in section 5, the article puts forward a speci#cally legal conception of the relationship between strategy and tactics, developing a position of ‘principled opportunism’. 2. !e Anatomy of a Distinction 2.1. Politics as War Although today strategy is perhaps seen as synonymous with the world of business, it has its origins in what we might call military science, and continues to be a central term in the contemporary military world. Indeed many of those who used the terms ‘strategy’ or ‘tactics’ in describing politics were in"uenced directly by these military theorists.8 Accordingly, before turning to the political usage of the term, it is wise to begin with how these military theorists have dealt with these notions. Carl von Clausewitz, one of the most in"uential exponents of modern military theory, de#ned strategy as: [T]he use of the engagement to attain the object of the war ... It must therefore give an aim to the whole military action. !is aim must be in accord with the object of the war. In other words, strategy develops the plan of the war, and to the aforesaid aim links the series of acts which are to lead to it; that is, it plans the separate campaigns and arranges the engagements to be fought in each of them.9 Strategy is – in essence – how it is that one would #ght and win a war: connecting the various individual battles together so as to achieve this broader objective. In contradistinction to this is tactics, which is concerned with smaller and shorter term matters. Tactics are concerned with how to win the individual battles and engagements of which the war is composed.10 If we wish to translate this metaphor into more general terms, we might say that strategy concerns the manner in which we achieve and eventually fulfil our long term aims or objectives, whereas tactics concerns the methods through which we achieve our shorter term aims or objectives. !e obvious conclusion here, and one that will be important to bear in mind throughout this article, is that when we talk of ‘pragmatism’ or ‘effectiveness’ it need not be referring to only the immediate situation. As will be explored more fully below, any tactical intervention will also have strategic consequences. !is means that when thinking about e$ectiveness, it is necessary to understand the inherent relation between strategy and tactics.11 In so doing, the distinction allows us to consider how effective particular (seemingly ‘short term’) interventions might be in the longer term. The very obvious difficulty here is that in practical terms it may be quite dif- #cult to distinguish between the long term and the short term. !is is particularly true in the case of political interventions. More than this, however, temporality does not quite capture the distinction between a ‘battle’ and a ‘war’. Although it is clear that there are temporal di$erences between the two, there could be innumerable examples of long battles or short wars. Instead, the difference between a battle and a war (and therefore between tactics and strategy) seems to turn on a structural distinction, lying in the particular aims and objectives of the different types of engagement. Whilst the task of a battle is generally simply to defeat a given enemy militarily, the task of a war will be more complex, involving the disposition of forces, decisions about whether some battles should even be fought (or whether some ought to simply be lost) and complex political and diplomatic aspects.12 Of course this difference in kind generally does correspond to a distinction between the long and the short term, but this does not represent the ‘essence’ of the problem. As such, whilst temporality remains an important part of the distinction, it cannot be the sole factor underlying it. 2.2. Organic and Conjunctural Accordingly, it is not the case that the particular way in which the distinction operates in military terms can be directly mapped onto the political and legal sphere. !is is especially true given that war is – to quote Clausewitz again – ‘the continuation of policy by other means’13. Despite this, there is a common thread running between military and political theory on this subject, with political thinkers sharing a similar understanding of strategy as operating in the ‘long term’. In order to understand how this has been ‘translated’, it is useful to turn to Antonio Gramsci’s distinction between organic and conjunctural moments and the type of ‘criticism’ that both entail: [I]n studying a structure, it is necessary to distinguish between organic movements (relatively permanent) from movements which may be termed “conjunctural” (and which appear as occasional, immediate, almost accidental). Conjunctural phenomena too depend on organic movements to be sure, but they do not have any very far-reaching historical significance; they give rise to a political criticism of a minor, day-to-day character, which has as its subject top political leaders and personalities with direct governmental responsibilities. Organic phenomena on the other hand give rise to socio-historical criticism, whose subject is wider social groupings – beyond the public #gures and beyond the top leaders.14 Gramsci articulated this distinction – in part – in order to understand the logic of strategic and tactical interventions in the political sphere.15 In this account, strategy is related to organic phenomena, that is to say those relationships which are relatively permanent, and serve as the basic or fundamental structure of the field in which the intervention is made. In terms of Marxist political economy, the prime example of such a phenomenon would be the mode of production (for instance feudalism or capitalism) and the relations of production of which it is composed. Strategic questions are those that are addressed at critiquing and overturning these relationships. Accordingly, we might say that strategic interventions are ‘revolutionary’,16 inasmuch as they address critiquing or abolishing the basic logic of the system. Moreover, since they address relationships that operate at a broader and less immediate level than other struggles, strategic decisions are likely to be informed in a greater sense by ‘theory’ (hence Gramsci’s reference to ‘socio-historic’ criticism) as it becomes more important to understand and unpack the logic of the system. However, these considerations remain ‘prudential’ or ‘pragmatic’ inasmuch as they aim at #nding the most e$ective methods to achieve a goal. !e di$erence is simply that this goal is related to structural or systemic issues. By contrast tactics are concerned with conjunctural moments, that is to say those which are not structural in a direct sense. Tactics address those transitory conflicts and battles that occur in the political sphere, which could be a whole range of different issues: from an individual election, to a particular protest and so on. Consequently, there is a sense in which, in contrast to strategy, tactics would be more concerned with ‘reform’ than with revolution,17 since tactics deals with those occurrences which do not directly call the system into question. Of course, tactics and strategy do not exist in rigid isolation from each other. this is because – as above – any given act which has to be reckoned with ‘tactically’ will at the same time make up the broader pattern of engagements to which strategy directs our attention. Equally, there are situations in which the very ‘dayto-day’ issues may take on an immediately structural character, meaning tactical decisions will be immediately strategic. However, these ‘revolutionary’ situations are in fact extremely rare, occurring only in extraordinary historical conjunctures. For the majority of time the distinction between strategy and tactics is a necessary one because the critique of the basic structural logic of the system is not identical with every day struggles within it, and the critique of this structure is not one that has an immediate appeal to the majority of people. !us, to go back to an earlier point, the distinction between strategy and tactics could be said to be a consequence of advancing a ‘revolutionary’ critique in nonrevolutionary times. !is is where the issue of temporality returns, for whilst the distinction between strategy and tactics is a structural one, in non-revolutionary times it will almost always assume a temporal form. If the overturning of the social structure is not immediately on the cards, it must become a long term goal, whereas conjunctural issues necessarily operate in the shorter term. Since the strategy and tactics distinction only makes sense in non-revolutionary times, it follows that it will almost always appear in a temporal form. To put it simply, we might say strategy concerns #nding methods to achieve long term, systemic aims, whereas tactics concerns #nding methods to achieve short term, conjunctural aims.

B.     Violation – their advocacy statement doesn't defend an exportable action to reform status quo NATO security cooperation, [and they don’t provide a strategy that we can use post-round to achieve complete decol and achieve native sovereignty]

C.     Standards

1) Decision making – Debates over exportable praxes are key to decision making and action when faced with social conflict, social change, and [impacts of the aff]

2) Clash –we can’t contest the aff without clear statement of advocacy. This decks education as we can’t contest the implementation of the aff.

3) Burden shifting – omitting should allows for affs to advocate the status quo or make undeniable truth claims like racism bad, which explodes limits and shifts debate away from any core controversy.

4) Consequentialism – allows the negative to engage with the affirmative by positing potential negative outcomes of their methods which is key to strategy refinement

5) Key to switch side – Affs defending a positive praxis is key to good-faith testing methods of [decol, communism, etc]